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Abstract 
In policymaking, actors are likely to take the preferences of others into account when strategically 
positioning themselves. However, there is a lack of research that conceives of policy preferences 
as an interdependent system. In order to analyze interdependencies, we link actors to their policy 
preferences in water protection, which results in an actor-instrument network. As actors exhibit 
multiple preferences, a complex two-mode network between actors and policies emerges. We 
analyze whether actors exhibit interdependent preference profiles given shared policy objectives 
or social interactions among them. By fitting an exponential random graph model (ERGM) to the 
actor-instrument network, we find considerable clustering, meaning that actors tend to exhibit 
preferences for multiple policy instruments in common. Actors tend to exhibit interdependent 
policy preferences when they are interconnected, i.e., collaborate with each other. By contrast, 
actors are less likely to share policy preferences when a conflict line divides them. 
Keywords: Policy instruments, policy instrument preferences, collaboration, policy networks, 
two-mode networks, exponential random graph models 
 
Introduction 
The paper analyzes policy preferences of political actors in order to better understand collective 
policy formulation. In democratic systems, policy decisions rely on majorities formed through 
negotiations in decision-making processes. To create such majorities in line with own preferences, 
actors have an incentive to convince others of their own policy preferences. Similar policy 
preferences are thus an outcome of strategic positioning in a power game to create majorities. 
Actors may position themselves given others’ preferences through the exchange of information 
(Leifeld and Schneider 2012) or mutual learning about advantages and disadvantages of various 
policy options (Weible et al. 2010; Crona and Parker 2012). Thereby actors create common 
interpretations or reasoning and influence the policy preferences of those they have been in 
contact with before.  
Despite potential interdependencies between collective actors, there is a lack of research that 
conceives of policy preferences as an interdependent system. To address this research gap, we 
study mechanisms behind the formation of policy preferences of collective actors and take into 
account their interdependent choices. We analyze whether actors’ policy preferences are partly 
conditional on other actors’ choices, thereby forming a complex, interdependent system of 
preferences. More specifically, we ask: which joint properties lead actors to adopt similar policy 
preferences in the actor-instrument network? 
The “actor-instrument network” refers to our conceptualization of actors and their policy 
preferences as a two-mode network, where policy actors represent the first mode and policy 
preferences the second mode (for a similar approach see studies on the support/veto of legislative 
bills by members of parliament, see Zhang et al. (2008), Harward and Moffett (2010), Briatte 
(2016)). We conceptualize policy preferences as support for, or rejection of, specific policy 
instruments. Policy instruments (e.g., bans, charges, information campaigns) are single means 
through which defined policy goals can be reached (Lasswell 1958).  Collective actors are 
organizations that participate in policymaking processes, including state-actors with formally 
assigned regulatory competences, and non-state actors who contribute to the design or 
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implementation of policies (Schneider 2014). A tie between an actor and a policy instrument 
indicates a preference (support or rejection) for that instrument by the actor. A complex two-
mode actor-instrument network emerges as actors exhibit multiple preferences, and multiple 
actors can prefer the same policy instrument.  
To better understand the mechanisms driving this interdependent system of preferences, we 
employ a model that specifically accounts for interdependencies of observations, called 
Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM) or p* model (Robins, Pattison, et al. 2007, Robins, 
Snijders, et al. 2007, Wasserman and Pattison 1996) Cranmer et al. 2017). The use of a network 
approach over dyadic logistic regression is necessary to model the dependencies between 
observations and avoid a resulting omitted variable bias because the actors possess mutual 
relevance and visibility in their instrument choices (Cranmer et al. 2017). While there exists a 
solid number of studies using ERGMs on one-mode data, fewer applications exist in the field of 
two-mode networks (but see Jasny 2012; Berardo 2014; Jasny and Lubell 2015). One contribution 
of this paper is to introduce non-standard endogenous model terms for the analysis of two-mode 
network data. Such methodological advances provide us with new tools to address the classic 
question of social theory about how behavior (in our case policy preferences) is affected by social 
relations (Granovetter 1985, Marsden 1981). 
The theoretical contribution of this paper consists of disentangling the different mechanisms that 
may lead actors to select the same policy. Bressers and O’Toole (1998, 2005) highlight two 
important aspects of social settings that can influence the choice of instruments in the process of 
policy formulation. They term the first mechanism “cohesion”, which is about similarity in actors’ 
policy objectives that frame their choices for policy instruments (see also Jenkins-Smith et al. 
2014). For example, actors who exhibit the goal to protect the environment can be assumed to also 
share similar policy preferences. The second mechanism captures a relational dimension of policy-
making and is called “interconnectedness”. Accordingly, actors who are linked by some sort of 
interaction in the policy process are more likely to develop similar policy preferences. 
“Interaction” is a generic term for any type of social relation, which in the case of policymaking 
involves, for example, information exchange, negotiations, or collaboration between policy actors. 
The distinction between similar objectives and interactions as two mechanisms influencing 
preference formation is a puzzling question, from a methodological and theoretical perspective. 
Theory 
The study of policymaking integrates different levels of analysis as one has to consider both the 
policy preferences on the individual actor level and their aggregate on the collective-level. How 
individual-level preferences are translated into collective decisions is a matter of scholarly debate. 
Actor-level approaches focus on micro-level explanations of policymaking. They claim that actors 
have intrinsic interests that guide their behavior or policy preferences (Olson (1965). Group-level 
approaches shift attention away from individual actors to networks of relationships and claim 
social foundations of policy preferences (Marsden 1981). A network approach is not only an 
aggregation of policy actors’ attributes, but it also takes into consideration actors’ 
interdependencies (Sandström and Carlsson 2008, Lubell et al. 2012). We explore the dialectical 
relationship between micro-level and meso-level foundations of preference formation by, first, 
considering actors’ joint attributes in form of policy objectives and, secondly, actors’ interactions 
in form of direct collaboration. 
 4 
Interdependencies of policy preferences 
Policymaking can be defined as the process during which actors work towards a) an agreement 
upon political goals and b) the selection of (appropriate) instruments to reach the defined goals 
(Howlett 2009, Landry and Varone 2005). It is not solely the work of authorities or single actors, 
but policymaking happens in a complex and intertwined setting that includes various public and 
private collective entities who aim to transform their preferences into public policy through their 
participation in the policymaking process (Knill and Tosun 2012, p. 41). The increased interest in 
network-like constellations of policymaking comes along with the recognition that, in most cases, 
no organization of government possesses sufficient authority, resources, and knowledge to enact 
and achieve policy intentions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Instead, policies require the 
concerted effort of multiple governmental and societal actors (Bressers, O’Toole, and Richardson 
1995, p. 4). In the study of environmental politics, the network approach is particularly relevant 
because pollution reduction requires the coordinated action of various sectors and levels across 
political boundaries. Thus, a networked policy subsystem is best approached through a network 
lens (Bressers, Huitema, and Kuks 1995, p. 7), which in our case involves a network of actors and 
their instrument preferences.  
The network approach represents a shift of focus away from the policy instruments themselves 
(and their effects) to the actors participating in the process. Bressers and O’Toole (1998) expect 
that network characteristics influence instrument selection (Majone 1976). This argumentation is 
in line with the “logic of appropriateness” according to which actors (involved in policymaking) 
tend to reproduce existing features of the social system, i.e., formal and informal power structures, 
roles, and institutions, through their policy choices (Sager 2009, March and Olsen 1989). This 
logic can best be studied by conceptualizing the policy process as a network, and by linking 
network features such as actors’ attribute similarity in terms of common objectives and their social 
relations to the choice of policy instruments. Bressers and O’Toole (1998) employ the term 
“cohesion” to refer to similar policy objectives that bring actors together or divide them in policy 
negotiations. With “interconnectedness”, Bressers and O’Toole highlight the relational patterns 
linking state and non-state actors, or elected authorities, and target groups. With strong similarity 
of objectives and high interconnectedness among network members, a wide range of policy 
instruments is possible as long as they keep the social system intact. Our contribution is to 
disentangle the two elements, policy objectives and interconnectedness, and to study their 
individual significance for policy preferences. Thereby, we seek to achieve a fine-grained 
understanding of the socio-political context in which policy instruments are selected. 
Policy objectives 
Key to understanding policymaking in general, and policy instrument selection in particular, is to 
consider the behavior of those actors involved in formulating policies (Bressers and O’Toole 2005). 
A central element guiding political actors’ behavior is their policy objectives, i.e., the goals they 
seek to transform into public policy in order to achieve their desired societal changes. In their 
work, Bressers and O’Toole distinguish situations in which actors share objectives from those 
situations where actors exhibit conflictive objectives. Additionally, they describe a third type of 
situation where actors’ objectives are not shared, but nevertheless compatible and mutually 
reinforcing. In policy processes where diverse types of actors participate, it is likely to find a 
distribution of objectives−from conflictive over mutually reinforcing to shared. In order to 
describe the overall level of similarity of objectives among actors participating in decision-making, 
Bressers and O’Toole employ the term “cohesion” (Bressers and O’Toole 1998). A high level of 
network cohesion describes a situation where network members, i.e., those actors who participate 
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in policymaking, share similar objectives. Cohesion, in turn, increases the probability of concerted 
instrument preferences. 
Other branches of the literature have tried to explain in more detail what drives actors to share or 
diverge on policy objectives. One explanation is that actors involved in policymaking relate to the 
world through a set of perceptual filters that supports them in articulating policy objectives 
(Munro et al. 2002, Munro and Ditto 1997). These filters are termed “beliefs” in the terminology 
of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier 1999); other scholars refer to “mental 
models” (Pahl-Wostl 2007) or “macroculture”, defined as norms and values shared across actors 
(Jones, Hesterley, and Borgatti 1997, Robins, Bates, and Pattison 2011). Such deeply rooted values 
or worldviews guide actors’ preferences in the more instrumental decisions of matching policy 
goals with the instruments to achieve those goals.  
Based on these theoretical underpinnings, we expect that actors relate to a similar set of policy 
instruments because they exhibit shared or mutually reinforcing objectives. Such shared 
instrument preferences are irrespective of coordination between actors, but are rather a result of a 
similar attribute, i.e., shared objectives in our case. Our hypothesis as depicted in Figure 1 reads as 
follows: 
H1 (policy objectives hypothesis): The more similar actors’ objectives are, the more likely they 
exhibit preferences for a similar set of policy instruments. 
Interconnectedness 
Network scholars like Marsden (1981) or Granovetter (1992, 1985) drew attention to social 
dependencies, where actors’ attitudes are influenced by the attitudes of their social environment. 
In a similar vein, policy actors are elements of social structures and therefore do not only 
individualistically form instrument preferences, but rather socially. Interactions among network 
members are likely to socially influence actors’ attitudes, perceptions, behavior, and policy 
preferences. From this perspective, not only actors’ attributes (e.g., objectives) need to be 
understood in order to explain policy preferences, but also actors’ ties and their embeddedness in 
their social environment. 
Particular to the political realm is that the structure of social relations reflects both formal 
hierarchy and informal bargaining processes. The logic of actors’ interactions is framed by macro-
political institutions, which define formal decision-making power, or participation mechanisms 
(Howlett and Ramesh 1995, Weible and Sabatier 2005, Varone 1998). However, the structure of 
policy networks does not only reflect the formal setup of the political (sub)system, but also 
informal aspects of policymaking. Informal aspects matter for network structures, because policy 
negotiations also involve actors without formal decision-making power participating in policy 
negotiations (Lubell et al. 2012, Börzel 1998). Actors without formal decision-making power, such 
as non-state actors from the science community or interest groups, can participate, for example, in 
the pre-parliamentary phase of policymaking processes.  
In the political realm, the structure of social relations matters to better understand how actors 
form their policy preferences. Actors create a social fabric in policymaking processes by initiating 
connections, e.g., by collaborating. As such connections among actors entail crucial information 
about social structure, the literature elaborates on several indicators of interconnectedness: the 
degree of inclusion of actors in policymaking processes (Ingold 2014, Ingold, Varone, and 
Stokman 2013), the quality of ties between authorities and target groups (Linder and Peters 1989, 
Varone 1998), or the degree of conflict between opposing coalitions (Weible, Pattison, and 
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Sabatier 2010). Mutual relations among actors, such as collaboration or reciprocal information 
exchange, can create a common understanding of the policymaking process (Henry 2011; Leifeld 
and Schneider 2012; Fischer and Sciarini 2016). Actor’ joint understanding of a situation, in turn, 
can lead to concerted policy preferences of actors in a policy subsystem. Studies also demonstrate 
that interconnectedness establishes trust and social capital, which can further enhance the 
creation of joint policy preferences (see Berardo and Scholz 2010). In this line of thought, we 
hypothesize as depicted in Figure 1: 
H2 (interconnectedness hypothesis): Actors who interact with each other tend to exhibit a 
preference for similar policy instruments.  
 
 
Figure 1: Schematic representation of Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Note: Hypothesis 1 on common objectives: two actors (circles) with same objective (red/black circle attribute) prefer the 
same policy instrument (square). Hypothesis 2 on interconnectedness: two actors (circles) interact (tie between actors) 
and prefer the same policy instrument (square). In this article, we do not horizontally distinguish selection and 
influence mechanisms, but rather vertically between hypotheses. 
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In summary, we observe the local topology (i.e., a structure of nodes and ties) of preference 
interdependencies as defined by three elements: actors’ attributes (objectives in our case), direct 
actor-actor interactions, and actors’ policy instrument preferences. We analyze whether actors 
exhibit similar instrument preferences given, on the one hand, mutual policy objectives and, on 
the other hand, direct actor-actor interactions. In hypothesis 1, we study whether the topology of 
preference interdependencies is paralleled by similar attributes of actors, namely their objectives, 
independently of coordination between actors. For example, two environmental organizations 
may both exhibit the objective to promote water protection and, therefore, support the 
instrument “effluent charge”. Despite their mutual objective, these actors do not necessarily 
coordinate their actions. Even without any transmission or exchange among actors, preference 
similarity exists. Similar policy preferences are consequently not a result of imitation or learning 
between actors in this mechanism, but rather an assortative mixing pattern (Newman 2002), 
where environmental organizations simply tend to support certain instruments, such as effluent 
charges. In hypothesis 2, on the other hand, we analyze situations where actors do interact 
directly and jointly support policy instruments. 
Our hypotheses are compatible with two causal mechanisms: social influence and social selection, 
which are generally confounded in observational studies of social networks (Shalizi and Thomas 
2011). Social influence (also known as diffusion or contagion; see also Gilardi 2016, Lindstädt et al. 
2017) posits that actors share attributes (H1) or collaborate (H2) first and then align their policy 
preferences in the two-mode network (see temporal pattern t1 and t2 in Figure 1). Selection (also 
known as homophily)1 posits that actors have congruent policy instrument preferences in the 
two-mode network first and develop shared attributes (H1) or collaboration ties (H2) as a 
consequence. Malang et al. (2017) demonstrate using a causal inference approach with temporal 
permutations that a causal identification strategy in this situation is only feasible if the timing of 
policy instrument preferences is measurable in a temporally fine-grained way on a nearly 
continuous time scale, which is next to impossible to implement for organizations’ policy 
instrument preferences. In this paper, we do not distinguish between social influence and 
selection effects in networks (as for example in Malang, Brandenberger, and Leifeld (2017)). We 
rather describe instrument preferences as an interdependent system given attribute similarity 
(common objectives) or direct ties (interactions) in order to discriminate between the specific 
patterns in the actor-instrument networks as shown by H1 and H2 in Figure 1. In Figure 1, we 
focus on the dark shaded actor-instrument networks, which either describe H1 or H2, but we do 
not incorporate the temporal dimension between t1 and t2, i.e., between left and right panels of 
Figure 1. 
Case and data 
Although our research question regarding the formation of policy preferences is relevant across 
policy domains, our study concentrates on environmental policy. The interplay between different 
types of actors is particularly relevant in environmental governance where diverse claims 
regarding the use and the protection of natural resources have to be balanced in policymaking. 
The integration of various stakeholders into environmental decision-making is often not a 
normative claim anymore, but an observable reality, namely through the establishment of 
collaborative governance structures (Newig and Fritsch 2009, Lubell and Fulton 2007, Bodin 2009, 
Ostrom, Cox, and Schlager 2014, Bodin and Prell 2011, Fischer and Leifeld 2015). Environmental 
                                                     
1 Both social selection and attribute similarity are compatible with the term „homophily“, because 
homophily refers to a pattern not a causal mechanism. 
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policy is therefore particularly well suited to analyze interplays between policy actors and the 
degree to which their exchanges affect the formulation of policy preferences. 
More specifically, we take the case of water protection policy in Switzerland where there is 
growing policy attention to what are called “micropollutants” or “emerging pollutants”, a large 
quantity of diverse chemicals that have only recently been detected and deemed a concern in 
water bodies due to improvements in analytical measurement technology (Schwarzenbach et al. 
2006). Sources of such micropollution include, for example, the use of pharmaceuticals, personal 
care products, detergents, biocides, or plant protection products (Hollender, Singer, and McArdell 
2008). Due to the large number of substances, sources, and entry-paths into the aquatic 
environment, it is a complex task to develop a pertinent policy response for the issue of 
micropollutants in water bodies and to choose among the many policy alternatives that exist. It is 
an ideal case to study policy preferences as the issue is rather new on the political agenda, and 
different actors involved in policymaking debate about a large variety of instruments that could 
potentially be introduced (Metz and Ingold 2014). 
Switzerland is a pioneer in this emerging policy domain, since the issue entered the political 
agenda in the early 2000s and concrete measures have been debated since then. The present study 
examines the amendment process of the Swiss Waters Protection Act and Ordinance that took 
place between 2007 and 2014, during which Swiss policy actors negotiated about how to best 
address micropollutants from point sources of pollution, i.e., from household wastewaters. From 
April to July 2013, we surveyed state and non-state collective actors, who participated and have a 
stake in this policy process on micropollutants, including governmental bodies, science, political 
parties, water, environmental, and economic associations. We surveyed policy actors when they a) 
participated at least twice in the process of amending the Waters Protection Act and Ordinance 
(decisional approach), or b) hold formal regulatory competences in the domain of emerging water 
pollutants (positional approach, or c) were considered important by knowledgeable experts in the 
field (reputational approach) (Laumann, Marsden, and Prensky 1983, Knoke 1994). 32 actors (or 
31 as one actor exhibits missing data on the objectives variable) replied to the relevant survey 
questions (see Figure 2 for the precise composition of the actor sample and Online Appendix 1 for 
the list of actors). 
 
Figure 2: Actor sample by type, level and conflict, n = 31. 
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We surveyed actors’ preferences about 15 policy instruments for the reduction of micropollutants 
on a four-point Likert scale, where respondents could indicate from 1 to 4 whether they strongly 
disagreed (1), disagreed somewhat (2), agreed somewhat (3) or strongly agreed (4) with the policy 
instrument. Table 1 provides an overview about the 15 different regulatory, economic, and 
voluntary policy tools that were surveyed. We generated the list of instruments based on an 
inventory of instruments in water protection (Metz and Ingold 2014). 
 
Table 1: Overview about surveyed instrument preferences. 
 Variable Description of instrument 
Regulatory 
instruments 
authrestr Bans or authorization restrictions of single emerging pollutants 
userestr Use restrictions of single emerging pollutants 
disposal Discharge requirements for products containing harmful substances 
bat Use of best available technique (BAT) for the elimination of 
emerging pollutants (e.g., technically upgrading wastewater 
treatment plants, treatment of wastewater partial flows in 
companies or hospitals) 
bep Use of best environmental practice (BEP) for the reduction of 
emerging pollutants inputs into waters 
eqn Establishment of environmental quality norms = immission limit for 
relevant substances 
el Definition of emission limits for selected pollutants 
control Control measures (e.g., expanding monitoring programs, obligatory 
registries for emerging pollutants) 
Market-
based 
instruments 
pcharge Product charges containing harmful substances 
wwfee Increase of the wastewater charge to fund measures for the 
reduction of emerging pollutants 
subsi Subsidies (e.g., for investments in filtering technology or monitoring 
technology, optimization of production processes) 
Information-
based 
instruments 
volunt Voluntary measures of companies and civil society (e.g., investments 
in filtering technology, optimize production processes, labeling, 
abdication)  
info Information campaigns, consulting 
research Research 
ppp Private-public partnerships, public-public partnerships 
 
Figure 3 shows the two-mode networks of actors (circles) and their preferences towards the 
surveyed policy instruments (squares). The data reveals, in the overwhelming majority of cases, 
positive (agree somewhat) to very positive (strongly agree) results (see left part of Figure 3). 
Survey respondents agree with many different policy options in principle (see left part of Figure 
3), while they have very specific ideas about what types of instruments they reject. The 
interesting variation thus occurs where respondents indicate that they disagree somewhat or 
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disagree strongly with a policy instrument (see right part of Figure 3). This observation aligns 
with research focusing on opposition against policy instruments (see for example Kammermann 
and Dermont forthcoming). When actors oppose a specific policy instrument (mix), they can 
potentially block the entire decision-making process. As opposition is crucial to the choice of 
policy instruments (Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins 1998), we focus on policy preferences in the 
form of rejection rather than agreement. Rejection and support can be modeled interchangeably 
here because there is no neutral category such that “not rejecting” is equivalent to supporting.  
 
 
Figure 3: Two-mode network of policy instrument preferences. 
Note: Support network (“agree somewhat” or “strongly agree”) on the left; rejection network (“disagree somewhat” or 
“strongly disagree”) on the right. Circles = actors, squares = policy instruments, ties = preferences in the form of support 
or rejection. 
For our independent variables, the survey further included several questions capturing actors’ 
objectives (H1) and their interconnectedness (H2). In water protection, actors can prioritize 
addressing the sources of pollution or the “end of the pipe”. We elicited actors’ objectives by 
asking respondents for their level of agreement, ranging from strongly agree (coded as 4) to 
strongly disagree (coded as 1), with the five following statements: 
 Measures should address the sources of pollution. 
 Measures should be end-of-pipe. 
 Precautionary measures should be taken to reduce potential risks for humans and the 
environment (precautionary principle). 
 It is reasonable to wait with policy measures until the impact of micropollutants is fully 
understood (risk-based principle). 
 Policy measures should aim at completely eliminating micropollutants in waters. 
Source-directed policy objectives reflect actors’ goal to prevent the release of pollution into water 
in order to reduce human impact on the environment. End-of-pipe objectives, by contrast, focus 
on eliminating pollutants after their use and release into water and echo actors’ priority in 
maintaining current consumption and production patterns. The precautionary principle stands for 
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the goal to adopt policy measures despite existing uncertainties about adverse impacts of 
micropollutants on humans or the environment. The risk-based principle, by contrast, is in line 
with the objective that policy action is only needed where risks haven been proven. Finally, 
actors’ objectives could diverge with regard to the level of pollution permitted (or admitted to be 
unavoidable) in water. 
We further collected responses on actors’ policy agenda priorities. Respondents were asked to rate 
the reduction of micropollutants as a higher priority, equal, or lower priority compared to 10 
other water policy issues, i.e., (1) ecological status of water bodies, (2) classic “macropollution” 
such as nutrients/fertilizers, (3) industrial emissions, (4) wastewater treatment, (5) water levels, (6) 
ground water, (7) drinking water, (8) hydropower, (9) flood protection, (10) water monitoring. 
Moreover, with the information about respondents’ actor types (federal-state, political party, 
regional/water/local, environmental, industrial/agricultural, science), we classified them into two 
groups. The first group consists of water and green organizations, and the second one of industrial 
and agricultural organizations.  
While the data described above serve as different proxies for policy objectives, the following data 
capture interconnectedness. We surveyed respondents’ interconnectedness by asking them with 
whom their organization closely collaborated during the Swiss policy process on micropollutants 
between 2007 and 2013. Respondents could check all their collaborators from a list of actors that 
we previously identified by applying the positional, decisional, and reputational approach; 
respondents could add missing actors to the list. Close collaboration was defined as discussing new 
findings, developing policy options, exchanging positions, evaluating alternatives. Not only 
interactions with Swiss actors may be relevant, but also with international actors, e.g., during 
transboundary water basin meetings. We therefore asked respondents to report their 
memberships in international water basin organizations and then coded their co-memberships. 
Methodology 
We estimate a bipartite (=two-mode) exponential random graph model (ERGM) (Wasserman and 
Pattison 1996) to explain policy instrument preferences of actors. A two-mode network or 
bipartite graph is a network with two separate types of nodes that displays the connections (also 
known as ties) between the two node types. In our case, 32 policy actors comprise the first node 
type (or “mode”), and 15 policy instruments comprise the second mode. Ties in this network are 
the instrument choices actors make. Within-mode ties are not possible on the dependent variable 
because a bipartite graph is mathematically defined by between-mode ties. We chose a bipartite 
network model because the explanandum is the portfolios of instrument preferences the actors 
collectively hold, not the relations between actors or between preferences. For methodological 
details on bipartite ERGMs, see Wang et al. (2009). For applications to policy networks, see 
Berardo (2014) and Jasny and Lubell (2015). To accommodate the bipartite network structure, the 
normalizing constant of the ERGM was adjusted accordingly by the software we employed for 
estimation, the R package ergm (Hunter et al. 2008). Goodness of fit was assessed using the xergm 
package (Leifeld, Cranmer, and Desmarais 2017), and regression tables were created using the 
texreg package (Leifeld 2013). 
The network we model is policy instrument rejection, as depicted on the right in Figure 3, while 
the reference group (the non-ties) contains all agreement ties depicted on the left in Figure 3. By 
modeling the sparser relation (rejection) instead of the denser complementary relation 
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(agreement), we count fewer instances of endogenous network statistics such as two-stars and 
shared partners. This makes the model more easily identifiable without having to redefine the 
endogenous network statistics for the ERGM. However, since agreement ties are treated as the 
baseline in the model, this means only a conceptual, but not a substantive change. 
The ERGM is a parametric model of the configuration of ties in a given network. Unlike a logistic 
regression model, the ERGM permits unbiased estimation of parameters for endogenous model 
terms that specify dependencies between observations (Cranmer and Desmarais 2011). It is 
important here to take into consideration that the profile of policy instrument preferences of one 
actor may depend, in part, on the preferences of another actor. We capture these dependencies by 
constructing respective model terms. 
The probability density function of the ERGM is given by 
𝑃(𝑁, 𝛉) =
exp{𝛉T𝐡(𝑁)}
∑ exp{𝛉T𝐡(𝑁∗)}𝑁∗∈𝒩
 
where the 𝛉 vector denotes the parameters of the model terms, the h vector contains the model 
terms, and the denominator represents the same sum of weighted statistics as the numerator, over 
all the network configurations one could have observed (Cranmer and Desmarais 2011, Cranmer 
et al. 2017). In the analysis, our task is to specify the exogenous and endogenous effects, or ℎ 
statistics, that contribute to the topology, or structure, of the network. 
These network statistics are conveniently specified as sums of subgraph products (see Cranmer et 
al. 2017 for details). For example, the number of 2-stars found in the network can be defined as 
the sum of the product of local configurations 𝑁𝑖𝑗 and 𝑁𝑘𝑗, where 𝑁𝑖𝑗 equals 1 if there is a tie from 
actor 𝑖 to instrument 𝑗 and 0 otherwise, and 𝑁𝑘𝑗 equals 1 if there is a tie from actor 𝑘 to 
instrument 𝑗 and 0 otherwise. Estimation was carried out through Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MCMC-MLE) (Hunter et al. 2008). Online Appendix 2 contains 
details about the estimation as well as robustness checks and alternative model specifications. 
Model terms 
We first introduce the model terms for our independent variables, then for the controls. Our two 
main variables, policy objectives and interconnectedness, can be operationalized in different ways. 
For the purpose of clarity, we therefore distinguish three versions of hypotheses 1 and 2, which in 
fact capture the same theoretical concept with slight nuances regarding measurement. 
These model terms are conceptualized as bipartite homophily terms of the following form: 
ℎhomophily = ∑ ∑ ∑(𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑁𝑘𝑗𝑓(𝑖, 𝑘, 𝑋))
𝑘≠𝑖𝑗𝑖
 
where 𝑓(𝑖, 𝑘, 𝑋) is some function of an exogenous actor covariate, which is stored in a square 𝑚 ×
𝑚 matrix 𝑋, and actor indices 𝑖 and 𝑘. We call this a “homophily” term because this model term 
tests whether a common property, such as a shared attribute or a collaboration tie, contributes to 
the probability that both actors 𝑖 and 𝑘 choose to have ties to the same instrument 𝑗. 
More technically, this term counts instances of open triangles where both actors 𝑖 and 𝑘 are 
jointly connected to the same policy instrument j through rejection ties, weighted by some shared 
or joint characteristic as expressed through a function of the exogenous covariate. For example, 
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this model term could be used to count how often two actors who collaborate or who have some 
shared property jointly reject policy instruments. In other words, this statistic captures the 
tendency of actors to co-reject or co-support policy instrument preferences when they share 
certain characteristics, which will be detailed below. 
H 1a: Policy objectives 
The first measure of attribute similarity is operationalized through our data on policy objectives. 
Those objectives frame the more specific instrument preferences held by actors (Bressers and 
O’Toole 1998, Sabatier 1999). Let X be a 32 × 5 matrix with the row actors’ policy objectives on a 
Likert scale from 1 to 4. 
The similarity in environmental policy objectives between actors i and k is defined as the inverse 
Euclidean distance (i.e., proximity) between rows in the policy objective matrix: 
𝑓objectives(𝑖, 𝑘, 𝑋) =
1
√∑ (𝑋𝑖𝑙 − 𝑋𝑘𝑙)2𝑙
 
where 𝑙 is the column index of the policy objective matrix and points to a specific objective. In 
other words, the ℎhomophily model term with 𝑓objectives(𝑖, 𝑘, 𝑋) captures the tendency of two 
actors i and k with shared objectives to co-reject the same policy instruments. 
H 1b (Policy objectives): Agenda priorities 
Actors differ in terms of the importance they ascribe to the micropollution problem relative to 
other issues related to water, such as the issues of flood prevention or hydropower. We identified 
ten issues including (1) ecological status of water bodies, (2) classic “macropollution” such as 
nutrients/fertilizers, (3) industrial emissions, (4) wastewater treatment, (5) water levels, (6) ground 
water, (7) drinking water, (8) hydropower, (9) flood protection, (10) water monitoring. We then 
measured actors’ judgments of each issue’s importance relative to micropollution (1 = more 
important than micropollution; 0 = equally important; -1 = less important). Each actor has a 
priority profile over these issues, with one of these three objectives for each issue. This yields a 
32 × 10 issue prioritization (or “agenda”) matrix 𝐴. 
The question we would like to answer with regard to issue prioritization is whether two actors 
who evaluate the issue of micropollutants as similarly important compared to other water policy 
issues tend to prefer similar policy instruments. This is accomplished by counting the number of 
two-stars centered on instrument j weighted by the similarity of priority profiles of actors 𝑖 and 𝑘 
involved in the 𝑘-star. This corresponds to the following function, which is identical to the 
previous 𝑓objectives(𝑖, 𝑘, 𝑋) function with a new covariate matrix 𝐴 for the actors’ issue 
prioritization or agendas: 
𝑓issue−prioritization(𝑖, 𝑘, 𝐴) =
1
√∑ (𝐴𝑖𝑙 − 𝐴𝑘𝑙)2𝑙
 
In other words, we compute the inverse of the Euclidean distance of any two row actors in terms 
of their issue prioritizations and weight any actor-instrument-actor two-path in the rejection 
graph by the similarity term. 
H 1c (Policy objectives): Conflict 
We also test whether material interest conflicts lead to diverging evaluations of policy 
instruments. We accomplish this by defining an explicit conflict line that we expect to be present 
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in the data: if actor 𝑖 is a water association or environmental association and actor 𝑘 is an 
industrial or agricultural association, we expect conflicting opinions on how micropollution 
should be regulated. To do this, we insert the following function into the bipartite homophily 
model term defined above. The term captures the tendency of the network to have actor pairs 
with jointly present rejection ties to an instrument and who have conflicting organizational types: 
𝑓org−type−conflict(𝑖, 𝑘, 𝑥)
= [𝑥𝑖 = industry/agriculture] ∙ [𝑥𝑘 = environment/water]  
+ [𝑥𝑖 = environment/water] ∙ [𝑥𝑘 = industry/agriculture]   
where 𝑥 denotes a vector of categorical actor types and square brackets are an indicator function 
that returns 1 if true and 0 otherwise. 
We expect a negative coefficient for this model term as the presence of a conflicting actor type 
configuration should lead to less co-rejection of instruments than in non-conflicting actor type 
configurations. 
The conflict hypothesis is strongly related to Hypothesis 1a on congruence of objectives. But 
rather than measuring congruence of objectives or conflict at a more abstract level of values or 
norms, Hypothesis 1c evaluates how strongly the similarity of objectives matters in terms of the 
functional roles actors take. 
H 2a (Interconnectedness): Collaboration 
Let 𝐶 be a 32 × 32 binary matrix indicating collaboration between actors 𝑖 and 𝑘. Then including  
𝑓collaboration(𝑖, 𝑘, 𝐶) = 𝐶𝑖𝑘 
in a bipartite homophily model term measures the tendency of actors to reject instruments that 
other actors with whom they maintain collaboration ties also reject. In other words, this term 
tests whether actors’ interconnectedness, operationalized through the maintenance of 
collaboration ties, is associated with similar policy preferences. 
The paper is about a bipartite, or two-mode, network of actors and instrument preferences as 
defined in the homophily statistic above. Here, we employ a one-mode network matrix 𝐶 in the 
construction of the bipartite model term. Theoretically, this tests whether one-mode 
collaborations are associated with similar policy instrument preferences in the two-mode 
network. 
H 2b (Interconnectedness): Structural similarity in the collaboration network 
If 𝐶 denotes the 32 × 32 binary collaboration network matrix, a structural similarity matrix can 
be computed as follows: 
𝑍 = 𝐶𝐶⊺ 
This matrix denotes how many collaboration partners two actors have in common. It is a measure 
of similarity in collaboration interactions, and more specifically, in terms of the structural position 
in the network. Structural similarity in the collaboration network tests whether actors with an 
overlap in their collaboration profiles are more likely than chance would predict to co-reject the 
same policy instruments: 
𝑓collaboration−structsim(𝑖, 𝑘, 𝑍) = 𝑍𝑖𝑘 
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This is a valuable alternative conceptualization of interconnectedness because interconnectedness 
may not only pan out directly through collaboration ties, but may equally plausibly occur through 
joint neighborhoods in the collaboration network. Joint exposure to common collaboration 
partners may spark the adoption of similar policy instrument preferences (or vice-versa). 
H 2c (Interconnectedness): Co-membership in water basin organizations 
Not only direct and indirect collaboration, but also mutual memberships in international water 
basin organizations can be an indicator of regular contact and interactions between two actors. 
When actors are members of the same water basin organization or platform, this significantly 
increases their chance of regularly exchanging information on policy preferences (Leifeld and 
Schneider 2012; Fischer and Leifeld 2015). Let 𝐵 be a 32 × 2 binary matrix indicating 
collaboration between actors 𝑖 and international collaboration partners 𝑙. Then we are interested 
in whether the co-occurrence network 𝐵𝐵⊺ exerts any influence on the policy instrument 
preferences of actors. In other words, is an actor likely to reject (support) an instrument if there 
are many other actors who also reject (support) the same instrument with whom the focal actor 
shares international collaboration partners? This tendency is captured by inserting the following 
quantity into the bipartite homophily model term: 
𝑓𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟−𝑏𝑜𝑑𝑦(𝑖, 𝑘, 𝐵) = ∑ 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝐵𝑘𝑙
𝑙
 
Endogenous control: Edges 
The edges term counts the number of edges in the two-mode network. This can be interpreted 
like a constant in a generalized linear model and serves as a baseline for the probability of edges in 
any dyad in the network: 
ℎedges = ∑ ∑ 𝑁𝑖𝑗
𝑗𝑖
 
Including the edges term is necessary in any ERGM, because it controls for the baseline edge 
probability, in this case the general rate of policy instrument rejection (like the offset 𝛼 in a linear 
regression model). 
Endogenous control: Actor degree 0 
Figure 3 (right panel) displays a number of actors that do not reject any policy instruments at all. 
This is an endogenous property of the network that distinguishes it from a random graph with the 
same number of nodes and edges. Therefore we need to control for the number of actors with 
degree 0 (“isolates”) to avoid omitted variable bias due to an incomplete specification of the 
endogenous part of the data-generating process: 
ℎisolates = ∑ [∑ 𝑁𝑖𝑗
𝑗
= 0]
𝑖
 
Endogenous control: Instrument two-stars 
Some policy instruments receive many rejection ties while others are almost universally accepted. 
A two-star effect centered on the second mode (policy instruments) tests whether one rejection of 
an instrument is related to another rejection of the same instrument or, in other words, whether 
there is a popularity effect at work in which rejections tend to cluster within instruments. This 
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may be the case if some instruments are universally considered poor solutions, for example. The 
two-star effect is defined as follows: 
ℎinstrument−popularity = ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑁𝑘𝑗
𝑘≠𝑖𝑗𝑖
 
Including this term as a control variable is also important to distinguish the bipartite homophily 
effects defined above from the mere popularity of certain policy instruments. 
Endogenous control: Geometrically weighted non-edgewise shared partners 
Finally, we control for geometrically weighted non-edgewise shared partners (GWNSP), a typical 
dependency term for capturing clustering in two-mode networks. This model term computes the 
tendency of the network to have open two-paths, and it discounts higher numbers of two-paths 
between the same nodes. A two-path can exist between actors (via one or more instruments) or 
between two instruments (via one or more actors). GWNSP counts how many such two-paths 
exist between any given within-mode dyad, computes the aggregated distribution over the whole 
network, and sums up the counts in a geometrically weighted way by down-weighting higher 
numbers of shared partners geometrically (here: with an alpha parameter of 2.0). The definition of 
GWNSP (following the exposition of Hunter 2007) is 
ℎGWNSP(𝛼) = 𝑒
𝛼 ∑{1 − (1 − 𝑒−𝛼)𝑖}𝐸𝑃𝑖(𝑁)
𝑛−2
𝑖=1
 
where 𝛼 is the geometric decay parameter (chosen inductively by model fit), and 𝐸𝑃𝑖(𝑁) is the 
number of dyads within the same mode that have exactly 𝑖 shared partners. This weighted count 
effectively controls for clustering in the network in the sense that actors share multiple co-
rejections and instruments are co-rejected by multiple actors. Omitting this endogenous 
dependency would yield biased estimates of the main hypotheses because homophily terms may 
be statistically conflated with the general tendency for co-rejection of instruments if not modeled 
separately. 
Exogenous control variable: Degree centrality in the collaboration network 
The effects related to collaboration between actors can only be interpreted in a valid way if we 
control for the number of collaboration ties actors have in the first place (i.e., their activity). 
Therefore we also include the number of ties, or degree, of any actor: 
ℎcollaboration−degree = ∑ ∑ (𝑁𝑖𝑗 ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑘
𝑘
)
𝑗𝑖
 
Exogenous control: Non-adjacent competence level 
Assume 𝑔 is a vector of ordinal-scaled competence levels of policy actors from 1 (national level) to 
3 (local level). 
This term tests whether actors at non-adjacent and non-identical levels (i.e., national and local) 
have less congruent policy instrument preferences: 
𝑓complevel−nonadjacent(𝑖, 𝑘, 𝑔) = [|𝑔𝑖 − 𝑔𝑘| > 1] 
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The square brackets denote an indicator function, which returns 1 if the term inside the 
parentheses is true and 0 otherwise. In this case, the function returns 1 if the absolute distance 
between the competence levels is larger than 1, i.e., if one actor has a competence level of 1 (= 
national level) and the other one 3 (= local level). The function is inserted into a bipartite 
homophily model term defined above. 
It is plausible that actors at the same level develop shared approaches to dealing with a problem. It 
is still somewhat plausible that actors of adjacent levels, i.e., local and regional or regional and 
national actors, influence each other’s instrument choices somewhat, respectively. Therefore we 
control whether a spillover of instrument preferences is implausible in order to yield a clean test 
for the other hypotheses. 
 
Figure 4: Instrument preferences for 15 policy instruments, from most coercive instruments on the left to least coercive 
instruments on the right (for an explanation of the surveyed policy instruments, see Table 1). 
Note: squares in black and dark grey coded as 1 and 2 = rejection, squares in light grey coded as 3 and 4 = support; 31 
surveyed actors are ordered by conflict line. Bottom = advocates of water protection (including: ARPEA to WWF = 
environmental associations, BPUK to VSA = water and local/cantonal), middle = advocates of economy (including: 
ECON/SAV to SGV = industry/agricultural associations, CVP and SVP = conservative parties), top = other (including: 
FDP to SP = political parties, BAFU-Chem to UREKS = federal government and parliament, BMG to UBAS = science). 
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Results 
Figure 4 illustrates which types of policy instruments received particularly high rejection rates 
(squares in black and dark grey coded as 1 and 2) and support (squares in light grey coded as 3 and 
4). There are high levels of support with most types of policy interventions, which further 
illustrates that opposition towards policy instruments is the crucial point of negotiation rather 
than the support of instruments. Economic instruments (product charges, wastewater fees, 
subsidies) enjoy highest rejection rates, while most regulatory and voluntary instruments are far 
less controversial. 
The actors in Figure 4 are ordered according to conflict lines. Actors who advocate water 
protection (from ARPEA to VSA) appearing in the bottom part of Figure 4 tend to support a 
variety of policy instruments with one exception: KVU, the Cantonal Offices for Environmental 
Protection, rejects voluntary instruments and information campaigns as too “soft”. By contrast, 
actors who represent industrial and agricultural interests (from ECON/SAV to SGV and 
conservative parties such as SVP or CVP) reject a greater variety of policy instruments, in 
particular economic ones such as charges on products containing harmful substances or a 
wastewater fee. 
We previously illustrated the distribution of instrument preferences and turn now, in Figure 5, to 
the patterns behind interdependencies of policy preferences. As the opposition towards one policy 
instrument may logically preclude the opposition for another, there may be a strong tendency for 
policy preferences to cluster. Figure 5 shows combinations of instrument preferences in form of 
co-rejection as computed by a hierarchical cluster analysis. There is no clear clustering pattern, 
apart from product charges and subsidies that actors tend to co-reject in common. Results indicate 
that preference formation is not a function of the popularity of certain instruments, but rather the 
result of more complex social processes.  
 
Figure 5: Preference profiles of actors’ opposition (strongly disagree and disagree somewhat) towards 15 policy 
instruments, number of actors = 31. 
Note: Dendrogram based on an agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis with complete linkage of Euclidean distances 
of the instrument × actor matrix. 
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In order to understand the structure of preference interdependencies given common objectives or 
direct interactions, we estimated two models. The first model includes all hypotheses except for 
H1a (“policy objectives”). The second model includes all model terms. The reason is that to 
include H1a, it is necessary to drop one of the 32 actors because one actor exhibits missing data on 
this variable, and ERGMs can only be estimated if there are no missing data. The predictive 
(within-sample) performance, as indicated by the area under the receiver-operating characteristic 
curve (AUC-ROC) and the area under the precision-recall curve (AUC-PR), is identical in the two 
models, as are the substantive results. 
The findings in Table 2 show that there are interdependencies between actors’ policy preferences. 
We observe significant patterns for actors sharing multiple policy preferences (a positive effect for 
non-edgewise shared partners), meaning that actors tend to reject multiple policy instruments in 
common, rather than just one. Together with the negative two-stars coefficient, the results 
indicate that actors do not reject instruments independently of the preferences of other actors, but 
they rather tend to reject several policy instruments jointly. If an instrument is rejected by one 
actor, it tends to be rejected by other actors, too, but only if actors agree on rejecting several 
instruments jointly. There is thus a considerable social dimension in developing policy instrument 
preferences. 
In order to explain this complex, interdependent system of preferences we analyzed actors’ 
similarities in policy objectives. Our first operationalization of Hypothesis 1 on policy objectives 
does not yield any significant results. The same holds true for our second operationalization 
capturing agenda priorities that actors attribute to the issue of micropollutants. These results 
indicate that actors do not tend to align their preferences with others who are similar in terms of 
policy objectives or agenda priorities. By contrast, ideological conflict lines between water or 
environmental organizations, on the one hand, and industrial or agricultural organizations, on the 
other, systematically shape the topology of instrument preferences. In line with our expectations, 
actors who are divided by a conflict line are less likely to exhibit interdependent policy 
preferences. A conflict line between actors advocating the use of water resources and actors 
advocating the protection of it reduces their odds of co-rejecting policy instruments. Overall, we 
find mixed evidence for the policy objectives hypothesis. A conflict line divides actors along 
environmental and economic objectives. This conflict line is the only significant factor 
operationalizing hypothesis 1 that is associated with the co-rejection of policy instruments. 
We find significant results for actors’ interconnectedness in the form of collaboration ties. 
Whether actors collaborate with each other is significantly associated with their instrument 
preferences.  In our case of water protection policy, actors collaborated, for example, within 
working groups that the Federal Office for the Environment initiated in the framework of its 
“Strategy Micropoll” as of 2007. Those groups were composed of diverse actors including cantons, 
operators of treatment plants, drinking water associations, science, and industry. Within those 
groups, actors discussed about the water issue at hand and exchanged their positions on policy 
options thereby creating common interpretations of the problem and solutions. The policy process 
provided further opportunities for collaboration during the elaboration of the draft legal revision, 
consultations, or parliamentary debates. In sum, actors who participated in the policy process had 
numerous occasions to collaborate and develop shared instrument preferences.  
We do not only expect that collaboration induces shared instrument preferences (Figure 1, social 
influence, lower panel), but also that shared prior instrument preferences may lead to 
collaboration (Figure 1, social selection, lower panel). An actor is more likely to reject a policy 
instrument if the actor collaborates with a number of actors who also reject the same instrument, 
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and two actors likely collaborate if they have shared policy instrument preferences. Our results 
further corroborate the hypothesis according to which collaboration and instrument preferences 
interrelate in policy networks (Zafonte and Sabatier 1998; Fischer and Sciarini 2016).  
We also tested whether actors who occupy similar positions in the collaboration network – i.e., 
have the same shared contacts – (structural similarity) co-rejected the same instruments, but this 
is not the case. Indirect influence through shared collaborators does not play a role for the 
development of policy instrument preferences. Moreover, joint memberships in water basin 
organizations does not stimulate deliberation to the extent that shared memberships in these 
forums leads to shared policy instrument preferences, while controlling for actual collaboration 
between actors. Overall, there is support for the interconnectedness hypothesis, but only through 
direct collaboration, not through shared contacts or joint forum participation. 
We also tested the three mechanisms within each hypothesis separately (see Models 2b to 2f in 
Online Appendix 2) to avoid statistical problems with multicollinearity among predictors of the 
same theoretical category. Moreover, we tested one group of hypotheses at a time in a separate 
model specification to rule out multicollinearity between H1 and H2 (Model 2g in Online 
Appendix 2). These modifications did not change the conclusions substantively, which indicates 
that these are indeed complementary hypotheses rather than substitutes. 
Conceptualizing policy instrument preferences as a two-mode, rather than one-mode, network 
helps disentangling policy objectives from interconnectedness because modeling a one-mode 
projection of instrument preference similarity among actors would likely remove variation at the 
level of instruments that generates differences between policy objectives and interconnectedness. 
This more thorough approach therefore suggests that elements from both actors’ objectives and 
their interconnectedness play a role in the interdependent structure of policy instrument choices 
among actors. 
Regarding the exogenous control variables, results are significant for the activity (i.e., centrality) 
of actors in the collaboration network. Well-connected actors are less likely than expected by 
chance to co-reject policy instruments. There is no compelling evidence for shared instrument 
preferences when actors are geographically close to each other. Similarly to collaboration, this 
control variable models the proximity between actors. Geographical proximity, however, does not 
considerably impact actors’ interdependent choices. Results for competence levels (non-adjacent 
refers to local vs. national level) are not significant. Actors of adjacent levels do not tend to prefer 
similar policy instruments. The endogenous control variable “actor degree: 0” indicates that there 
are more isolates in the actor-instrument network, i.e., actors who do not reject any instrument, 
than expected by chance in networks of this size. 
Figure 6 displays endogenous goodness of fit diagnostics for our Model 2, which illustrate that we 
capture the endogenous properties of the network very well. The six panels show common 
auxiliary network statistics in the observed network (the black lines) and in 500 simulations from 
the estimated model (the gray boxplots). As the boxplot medians are usually very close to the 
observed statistics, we seem to have properly captured network dependence. 
Figure 7 shows receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) curves (red curve from bottom left to top 
right) and precision-recall curves (blue curve from top left to bottom right), with the light-shaded 
curves representing a null model for comparison. Both curves indicate a much better model fit in 
terms of classification performance of dyads than the null model, which means that the model has 
quite some explanatory value. The MCMC diagnostics (not reported here) indicate convergence, 
with a slight but yet unproblematic skewness for the isolates term.  
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Table 2: Results for the bipartite ERGM with standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
Hypothesis Model 1 Model 2 
Endogenous controls    
    
     Edges control -2.83*** -2.93*** 
  
(0.32) (0.31) 
     Actor degree: 0 control 1.20 1.45* 
  
(0.76) (0.65) 
     Two-stars (centered on policy instruments) control -0.21** -0.21*** 
  
(0.07) (0.06) 
     Non-edgewise shared partners (fixed at 2.0) control 0.38*** 0.38*** 
  (0.06) (0.06) 
Exogenous controls 
   
    
     Centrality in the collaboration network control -0.07* -0.06* 
  
(0.03) (0.03) 
     Competence level: non-adjacent control 0.00 0.02 
  
(0.08) (0.08) 
Policy objectives    
    
     Similarity of objectives H1a 
 
0.06 
   
(0.10) 
     Agenda priorities: structural similarity H1b 0.10 0.04 
  
(0.09) (0.12) 
     Actor type: Water/environment vs. 
industry/agriculture 
H1c -0.63** -0.56* 
  (0.22) (0.23) 
Interconnectedness 
   
    
     Collaboration H2a 0.27* 0.30* 
  
(0.13) (0.13) 
     Collaboration: structural similarity H2b 0.01 -0.00 
  
(0.02) (0.03) 
     Co-membership in water basin organizations H2c -0.10 -0.09 
  
(0.33) (0.33) 
Number of actors 
 
32 31 
Number of instruments 
 
15 15 
Number of dyads 
 
480 465 
Number of edges 
 
101 97 
AUC Precision-Recall  0.54 0.53 
AUC Precision-Recall random graph  0.20 0.22 
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Figure 6: Endogenous goodness of fit diagnostics for Model 2. (Model 1 is very similar.) 
Note: The six panels show common auxiliary network statistics in the observed network (the black lines) and in 500 
simulations from the estimated model (the gray boxplots). The close match between the observed network and the 
simulations based on the model indicate that the model reproduces key features of the network topology adequately, 
which means that any omitted variable bias due to unmodeled dependence is largely eliminated (cf. Cranmer et al. 
2017). The diagram was created using the xergm package (Leifeld et al. 2018). 
 
Online Appendix 2 contains additional model specifications, which rule out the possibility of 
multicollinearity (Model 2a), consider alternative explanations like clustering of instruments into 
overarching instrument categories (Models 2b-2e), the special role of decision-makers like 
governmental actors and parties and their instrument choices (Model 2f), geographical clustering 
of policy preferences (Model 2g), actor type homophily as a variable that may cluster actors’ 
preferences (Model 2h), and assess the outcomes of a different estimation technique (Model 2i). In 
short, none of these qualifications changes the main substantive results presented here, with the 
possible exception of clustering instrument preferences by overarching categories: If one assumes 
that every instrument is an indicator of a more general policy approach and if one controls for 
clustering within these approaches (regulatory, market-based, and information-based, see Table 
1), then in this one model specification, interconnectedness drops out of significance because the 
additional clustering takes away some of the residual variance that can be modeled using our main 
hypotheses. Conflict lines, however, still remain significant predictors of instrument preferences. 
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Figure 7: Within-sample predictive fit. Receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) curves (red curve from bottom left to 
top right) and precision-recall (PR) curves (blue curve from top left to bottom right), with the light-shaded curves 
representing a null model for comparison. 
Note: ROC and PR are two alternative measures for model fit that indicate to which extent simulations based on the 
model can reproduce the location of ties in the network (Leifeld et al. 2018). ROC curves trending towards the upper 
left corner indicate a good within-sample predictive performance of the model ( = high true positive rate and low false 
positive rate of the simulated networks in terms of tie prediction). PR curves trending towards the upper right corner 
indicate a good within-sample predictive performance ( = high precision and high recall of the rejection ties in the 
observed network). Both curves show a large difference between a null model and Model 2. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
In order to understand how policy actors strategically position themselves in water protection 
given the choices of others, we studied actors’ preferences for policy instruments as an 
interdependent system. We modeled the social interdependencies by conceptualizing policy 
preferences as a two-mode network of actors and their instrument preferences for pollution 
reduction measures. By fitting an ERGM, we studied the mechanisms behind the formation of 
policy preferences. Thereby the article contributes to the literatures on collective decision-
making, policy preferences, and networks. Our first contribution is that we find evidence for 
network interdependencies between actors’ policy preferences through considerable clustering in 
the actor-instrument network. The two-mode network lens offers a particularly sound approach 
to the study of preference formation as it has the ability to capture the complex and 
interdependent system of actors and their preferences. 
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The network dependence at work might take the form of diffusion of preferences among actors. 
However, causality cannot be disentangled in a cross-sectional study (and usually not with 
temporal data unless they are nearly continuously observed; see Malang et al. 2018). 
Consequently, it may be plausible that factors like collaboration are not solely the cause, but also a 
consequence of similar preferences. Future research should adopt a fine-grained longitudinal 
perspective on instrument preferences in order to examine the temporal pattern of policy 
instrument diffusion and separate it from social selection. To achieve this goal, either advances in 
the temporal measurement of organizational preferences or experimental design will be necessary. 
Our second contribution is that we empirically studied the relationship between individual-level 
and group-level foundations of preference formation. On the individual level, we considered 
actors’ attributes in the form of shared objectives (as in H1), and on the group level, we considered 
relational effects trough collaboration (H2). With regard to relational effects, we observe that 
interconnected actors, who collaborate with each other, tend to exhibit interdependent policy 
preferences (confirmation of Hypothesis 2). Pertaining to attribute-based effects, we find that 
instrument preferences are partly conditional on others who exhibit similar functional roles and 
responsibilities (partial confirmation of H1). This is a form of political homophily or heterophily 
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). However, we do not find any evidence for political 
homophily in the form of shared policy objectives or agenda priorities. Homophily effects in the 
form of shared beliefs are well-documented (Calanni et al. 2014, Gerber, Henry, and Lubell 2013, 
Ingold and Fischer 2014, Zafonte and Sabatier 1998). The cited studies find evidence that actors 
who share beliefs tend to collaborate, but they do not investigate the consequences of 
collaboration on preference formation. Our results contribute to closing this gap by analyzing 
both the role of underlying objectives and collaboration on preference formation. Findings 
indicate that actors’ objectives defined by their functional roles (as operationalized by H1c), and 
actors’ interconnectedness (as operationalized by H2a), play a role in shaping the collective 
preferences of a nascent policy domain. As alternative operationalizations of interconnectedness 
(H2b-c) and policy objectives (H1a-b) did not yield significant results, we conclude that those 
variables operate through specific mechanisms. With our study, we contribute to conceptual 
precision around these mechanisms. 
Policy decisions are not merely in the hands of selected public officials or authorities, but take 
place in a governance structure involving different public and private actors. In such complex 
settings, the agreement upon what instruments to select and which ones to reject represents an 
important precondition to successfully produce policy outputs and overcome collective action 
problems. Future research should investigate in a longitudinal design whether actors use their 
collaboration ties as a mechanism of preference coordination and compromise settlement. If this 
were not the case, i.e., if actors formed their instrument preferences on the basis of their own 
fixed objectives only, producing policy outputs would be very difficult where actors with 
conflicting objectives participate in decision-making. But, our results indicate that not only 
functional roles, but also interconnectedness matters for the formation of policy preferences. 
Hence, actors can overcome their differences and successfully agree on policies when they initiate 
connections and exchanges during policy negotiations. In summary, where policy preferences 
depend both on fixed roles (as indicated by H1c) and collaboration (H2a), policymaking is both a 
function of who participates in policymaking and a matter of negotiation and, hence, 
compromise-seeking. 
Finally, our results indicate that deliberation, if it matters in policy instrument preference 
formation, is constrained to direct collaboration between actors rather than international forums. 
Future research should seek to evaluate the precise relationship between coordination through 
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policy forums and direct collaboration between actors and the consequences for preference 
formation. 
 
References 
Berardo, Ramiro. 2014. "Bridging and Bonding Capital in Two-Mode Collaboration Networks."  
Policy Studies Journal 42 (2):197–225. 
Bodin, Ö., Crona, B.I. . 2009. "The role of social networks in natural resource governance: What 
relational patterns make a difference?"  Global Environmental Change 19:366–374. 
Bodin, Örjan, and Christina Prell, eds. 2011. Social Networks and Natural Resource Management. 
Uncovering the Social Fabric of Environmental Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Börzel, Tanja. 1998. "Organizing Babylon. On the Difierent Conceptions of Policy Networks."  
Public Administration 76:253-273. 
Bressers, Hans, Dave Huitema, and Stefan Kuks. 1995. "Policy Networks in Dutch Water Policy." 
In Networks for Water Policy. A Comparative Perspective, edited by Hans Bressers, 
Laurence O'Toole and Jeremy Richardson, 24-51. London: Frank Cass. 
Bressers, Hans, and Laurence O’Toole. 1998. "The Selection of Policy Instruments: A Network-
Based Perspective."  Journal of Public Policy 18 (3):213-239. 
Bressers, Hans, and Laurence O’Toole. 2005. "Instrument selection and implementation in a 
networked context." In Designing government: From instruments to governance, edited 
by Pearl Eliadis, Margaret Hill and Michael Howlett, 132-153. Montreal, Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
Bressers, Hans, Laurence O’Toole, and Jeremy Richardson, eds. 1995. Networks for Water Policy: 
A Comparative Perspective. London: Frank Cass. 
Briatte, François. 2016. "Network Patterns of Legislative Collaboration in Twenty Parliaments."  
Network Science 4 (2):266-271. doi: 10.1017/nws.2015.31. 
Calanni, John C., Saba N. Siddiki, Christopher M. Weible, and William D. Leach. 2014. 
"Explaining Coordination in Collaborative Partnerships and Clarifying the Scope of the 
Belief Homophily Hypothesis."  Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 
doi: 10.1093/jopart/mut080. 
Cranmer, Skyler, and Bruce Desmarais. 2011. "Inferential Network Analysis with Exponential 
Random Graph Models."  Political Analysis 19:66-86. 
Cranmer, Skyler J., Philip Leifeld, Scott D. McClurg, and Meredith Rolfe. 2017. "Navigating the 
Range of Statistical Tools for Inferential Network Analysis."  American Journal of Political 
Science 61 (1):237-251. 
Fischer, Manuel, and Philip Leifeld. 2015. "Policy Forums: Why Do they Exist and What are they 
Used for?"  Policy Sciences 48 (3):363-382. 
Gerber, Elisabeth, Adam Douglas Henry, and Mark Lubell. 2013. "Political Homophily and 
Collaboration in Regional Planning Networks."  American Journal of Political Science 57 
(3):598-610. 
Granovetter, Mark. 1985. "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness."  
American Journal of Sociology 91:481-510. 
Granovetter, Mark. 1992. "Economic Institutions as Social Construction: A Framework of 
Analysis."  Acta Sociologica 35:3-11. 
Harward, Brian M., and Kenneth W. Moffett. 2010. "The Calculus of Cosponsorship in the U.S. 
Senate."  Legislative Studies Quarterly 35 (1):117-143. 
 26 
Hollender, Juliane, Heinz Singer, and Christa McArdell. 2008. "Polar Organic Micropollutants In 
The Water Cycle." In Dangerous Pollutants (Xenobiotics) in Urban Water Cycle, edited by 
Petr Hlavinek, Ongjen Bonacci, Jiri Marsalek and Ivana  Mahrikova, 103-116. Dodrecht: 
Springer. 
Howlett, Michael. 2009. "Governance modes, policy regimes and operational plans: A multi-level 
nested model of policy instrument choice and policy design."  Policy Science 42:73-89. 
Howlett, Michael, and M Ramesh. 1995. Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy 
Subsystems. Toronto, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Hunter, David. 2007. "Curved exponential family models for social networks." Social Networks 29 
(2): 216-230. 
Hunter, David, Mark  Handcock, Carter Butts, Steven Goodreau, and Martina Morris. 2008. 
"ergm: A Package to Fit, Simulate and Diagnose Exponential-Family Models for 
Networks."  Journal of Statistical Software 24 (3). doi: 10.18637/jss.v024.i03  
Ingold, Karin. 2014. "How involved are they really? A comparative network analysis of the 
institutional drivers of local actor inclusion."  Land Use Policy 39:376-387. 
Ingold, Karin, and Manuel Fischer. 2014. "Drivers of collaboration to mitigate climate change: An 
illustration of Swiss climate policy over 15 years."  Global Environmental Change 24:88-
98. 
Ingold, Karin, Frédéric Varone, and Frans Stokman. 2013. "A social network-based approach to 
assess de facto independence of regulatory agencies."  Journal of European Public Policy 
20 (10):1464-1481. 
Jenkins-Smith, Hank, Carol L. Silva, Kuhika Gupta, and Joseph T. Ripberger. 2014. "Belief System 
Continuity and Change in Policy Advocacy Coalitions: Using Cultural Theory to Specify 
Belief Systems, Coalitions, and Sources of Change."  Policy Studies Journal 42 (4):484-508. 
doi: 10.1111/psj.12071. 
Jones, Candace, William S. Hesterley, and Stephen P. Borgatti. 1997. "A General Theory of 
Network Governance: Exchange Conditions and Social Mechanisms."  Academy of 
Management Review 22 (4):911–945. 
Kammermann, Lorenz, and Clau Dermont. forthcoming. "Avoiding the Inevitable – Opposition 
against instruments promoting renewable energy transitions."  Energy Research & Social 
Science. 
Keohane, Nathaniel, Richard Revesz, and Robert Stavins. 1998. "The choice of regulatory 
instruments in environmental policy."  Harvard Environmental Law Review 22 (2):313-
367. 
Knill, Christoph, and Jale Tosun. 2012. Public Policy: A New Introduction. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Knoke, David. 1994. "Networks of Elite Structure and Decision Making." In Advances in Social 
Network Analysis: Research in the Social and Behavioral Sciences, edited by Stanley 
Wasserman and Joseph Galaskiewicz, 274-95. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Landry, Réjean, and Frédéric Varone. 2005. "The Choice of Policy Instruments: Confronting the 
Deductive and the Interactive Approaches." In Designing government. From instruments 
to governance, edited by F. P.  Eliadis, M. M.  Hill and M. Howlett, 106-131. Montreal, 
Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press. 
Lasswell, Harold. 1958. Politics: who gets what, when, how. With postscript (1958). New York: 
Meridian Books. 
Laumann, Edward, Peter Marsden, and David Prensky. 1983. "The Boundary Specification 
Problem in Network Analysis." In Applied Network Analysis: A Methodological 
Introduction, edited by Ronald Burt and Michael Minor. Beverly Hills: Sage. 
 27 
Leifeld, Philip. 2013. "texreg: Conversion of Statistical Model Output in R to LaTeX and HTML 
Tables."  Journal of Statistical Software (8):24. doi: 10.18637/jss.v055.i08. 
Leifeld, Philip, Skyler Cranmer, and Bruce Desmarais. 2017. xergm: Extensions of Exponential 
Random Graph Models. R package version 1.8.3. https://cran.r-project.org/package=xergm. 
Leifeld, Philip, and Volker Schneider. 2012. "Information Exchange in Policy Networks."  
American Journal of Political Science 56 (3):731-744. 
Linder, Stephen, and Guy Peters. 1989. "Instruments of Government: Perceptions and Contexts."  
Journal of Public Policy 9 (1):35-58. 
Lubell, Mark, and Allan Fulton. 2007. "Local Diffusion Networks as Pathways to Sustainable 
Agriculture."  California Agriculture 61 (3): 131-137. 
Lubell, Mark, John Scholz, Ramiro Berardo, and Garry Robins. 2012. "Testing Policy Theory with 
Statistical Models of Networks."  Policy Studies Journal 40 (3):351-374. 
Malang, Thomas, Laurence Brandenberger, and Philip Leifeld. 2017. "Networks and social 
influence in European legislative politics."  British Journal of Political Science Accepted 
for Publication. 
March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1989. Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis 
of Politics. NewYork: Free Press. 
Marsden, Peter V. 1981. "Introducing Influence Processes into a System of Collective Decisions."  
American Journal of Sociology 86 (6):1203-1235. 
McPherson, Miller, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and James M. Cook. 2001. "Birds of a Feather: Homophily 
in Social Networks."  Annual Review of Sociology 27:415–444. 
Munro, Geoffrey D., and Peter H. Ditto. 1997. "Biased Assimilation, Attitude Polarization, and 
Affect in Reactions to Stereotype-Relevant Scientific Information."  Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin 23 (6):636-653. 
Munro, Geoffrey D., Peter H. Ditto, Lisa K. Lockhart, Angela Fagerlin, Mitchell Gready, and 
Elizabeth Peterson. 2002. "Biased Assimilation of Sociopolitical Arguments: Evaluating the 
1996 U.S. Presidential Debate."  Basic and Applied Social Psychology 24 (1):15-26. 
Newig, Jens, and Oliver Fritsch. 2009. "Environmental governance: participatory, multi-level – 
and effective?"  Environmental Policy and Governance 19 (3):197-214. 
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The logic of collective action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Ostrom, Elinor, Michael Cox, and Edella Schlager. 2014. "An Assessment of the Institutional 
Analysis and Development Framework and Introduction of the Social-Ecological Systems 
Framework." In Theories of the Policy Process, edited by Paul  Sabatier and Christopher 
Weible, 267–306. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Pahl-Wostl, Claudia. 2007. "The implications of complexity for integrated resources 
management."  Environmental Modelling & Software 22 (5):561-569. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsoft.2005.12.024. 
Robins, Garry, Lorraine Bates, and Philippa Pattison. 2011. "Network Governance and 
Environmental Management: Conflict and Cooperation."  Public Administration 89 
(4):1293-1313. 
Robins, Garry, Pip Pattison, Yuval Kalish, and Dean Lusher. 2007. "An introduction to 
exponential random graph (p*) models for social networks."  Social Networks 29 (2):173-
191. 
Robins, Garry, Tom Snijders, Peng Wang, Mark Handcock, and Philippa Pattison. 2007. "Recent 
developments in exponential random graph (p*) models for social networks."  Social 
Networks 29 (2):192-215. 
Sabatier, Paul. 1999. Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder, CA: Westview Press. 
Sabatier, Paul, and Hank Jenkins-Smith. 1993. Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy 
Coalition Approach. Boulder: Westview Press. 
 28 
Sager, Fritz. 2009. "Governance and Coercion."  Political Studies 57 (3):537-558. 
Sandström, Annika, and Lars Carlsson. 2008. "The Performance of Policy Networks: The Relation 
between Network Structure and Network Performance."  The Policy Studies Journal 36 
(4):497-524. 
Schneider, Volker. 2014. "Akteurskonstellationen und Netzwerke in der Politikentwicklung." In 
Lehrbuch der Politikfeldanalyse, edited by Klaus Schubert and Nils Bandelow, 259-288. 
München: Oldenbourg. 
Schwarzenbach, René, Beate  Escher, Kathrin Fenner, Thomas Hofstetter, Annette Johnson, Urs 
Von Gunten, and Bernhard Wehrli. 2006. "The Challenge of Micropollutants in Aquatic 
Systems."  Science 313 (5790):1072-1077. 
Varone, Frédéric. 1998. Le choix des instruments des politiques publiques. Une analyse comparée 
des politiques d’efficience énergétique du Canada, du Danemark, des Etats-Unis, de la 
Suède et de la Suisse. Bern: Paul Haupt Verlag. 
Wang, Peng, Ken  Sharpe, Garry L. Robins, and Philippa E. Pattison. 2009. "Exponential Random 
Graph (p∗) Models for Affiliation Networks. Social Networks."   31 (1):12-25. 
Wasserman, Stanley, and Philippa  Pattison. 1996. "Logit models and logistic regressions for social 
networks: I. An introduction to Markov graphs and p*."  Psychometrika 61:401–425. 
Weible, Christopher, Andrew Pattison, and Paul Sabatier. 2010. "Harnessing expert-based 
information for learning and the sustainable management of complex socio-ecological 
systems."  Environmental Science & Policy 13 (6):522-534. 
Weible, Christopher, and Paul Sabatier. 2005. "Comparing Policy Networks: Marine Protected 
Areas in California."  Policy Studies Journal 33 (2):181-201. 
Zafonte, Matthew, and Paul Sabatier. 1998. "Shared Beliefs and Imposed Interdependencies as 
Determinants of Ally Networks in Overlapping Subsystems."  Journal of Theoretical 
Politics 10 (4):473-505. 
Zhang, Yan, A. J. Friend, Amanda L. Traud, Mason A. Porter, James H. Fowler, and Peter J. 
Mucha. 2008. "Community structure in Congressional cosponsorship networks."  Physica 
A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 387 (7):1705-1712. doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2007.11.004. 
 
